This paper revisits the magnet hypothesis and investigates the impact of the welfare geneorsity on the di¤erence between skilled and unskilled migration rates. The main purpose of the paper is to assess the role of mobility restriction on shaping the e¤ect of the welfare state genrosity. In a free migrtaion regime, the impact is expected to be negative on the skill composition of migrants while in a restricted mobility regime, the impact will be the opposite, as voters will prefer selective migration policies, favoring skilled migrants who tend to be net contributors to the …scal system. We utilize the free labor movement within EUR (the EU, Norway and Switzerland) and the restricted movement from outside of the EUR to compare the free migration Tel Aviv University and Cornell University, CEPR, NBER, and CES-ifo. y University of Southampton, CPC and IZA. z We would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions on a previous draft. 1 regime to the restricted migration regime. We …nd strong support for the "magnet hypothesis" under the free-migration regime, and the "…scal burden hypothesis" under the restricted-migration regime even after controlling for di¤erences in returns to skills in source and host countries.
Introduction
This paper aims at revisiting the social magnet hypothesis in international migration. It investigates the impact of the generosity of the welfare state in attracting migrants from abroad. The paper looks speci…cally at the skill composition of migration patterns, highlighting the di¤erence between skilled and unskilled migration rates. The novelty of the paper is in looking at the role of mobility restrictions in shaping the e¤ect of the welfare state on migration. In a free migration regime, the impact on the skill composition is expected to be negative while in a restricted regime, the impact might be the opposite one, as voters will prefer selective migration policies favoring skilled migrants who tend to be net contributors to the …scal system. is the higher relative skill composition of immigrants in the latter countries (see Table 1 ). 1 On …rst glance, this suggests that countries that have generous welfare systems also have relatively more unskilled immigrants, i.e.
welfare state generosity acts as a magnet for unskilled migrants. However, the skill composition of immigrants depends on many factors, and in particular on the policy regime; namely whether migration is free or restricted. In other words, the generosity of the welfare state may a¤ect the skill composition of immigrants di¤erently, depending on which immigration policy is adopted. The generosity of the welfare state determines the self-selection of potential migrants (supply-side mechanism) and the immigration policy in the destination country (demand-side mechanism). This paper takes advantage of heterogeneous bilateral immigration policies to identify and quantify these two mechanisms. The paper investigates how the skill composition of migration patterns di¤er between free and restricted migration regimes. It tests how the generosity of the welfare state a¤ects the skill composition of the immigrants across these policy regimes.
There has been large body of research on welfare migration, though with mixed results. 2 For example, Borjas (1999) , Enchautegui (1997) He …nds that the social insurance legislation, adopted by Bismarck in the 1880s, reduced the incentives of risk averse Germans to emigrate. He estimates that in the absence of 3 how the welfare-state generosity works e¤ectively as a magnet to migrants.
On the other hand, Levine and Zimmerman (1999) , show that welfare bene…ts have little e¤ect on the probability of female-headed households (the recipients of the bene…ts) to relocate in the US and Gelbach (2004) …nds strong evidence of welfare migration in 1980, but less in 1990 for the US. However, none of those studies control for the migration regime. 4 Studies of migration between states within the US can help only in providing evidence of a freemigration regime. On the other hand, studies that employ samples con…ned to the policy-controlled migration regime, but at the same time employ a model of the migrants'choice whether to migrate and to which country, are evidently problematic. In this case, the estimates convey little information about the migrants'choices (and hence on the welfare state as a magnet to unskilled migrants), but rather on the migration policy choices of the host country. Finally, studies that refer to both migration regimes without controlling for them are problematic because they do not disentangle migration policies in the host countries, and the individual migrant's migration choices in the source countries.
We use 14 core EU countries (old member states) plus Norway and Switzerland (EUR thereafter) to study empirically the policy-regime di¤er-ential e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of migration rates. Freedom of movement and the ability to reside and work anywhere within the EU are two of the fundamental rights which EU member social insurance, the German emigration rate from 1886 to 1913 would have been more than double its actual level. 4 An exception is the unpublished paper by Cohen and Razin (2009) which we follow and extend. 4 states must recognize and this extends through bilateral treaties also to Norway and Switzerland. In contrast, labor mobility into EUR member states from non-EUR states is still restricted. The paper utilizes this di¤erence in policy regimes between EUR and non-EUR states, to test the key di¤erences between free-and policy-restricted migration.
The paper has four main features. First, since welfare bene…ts might be one factor a¤ecting the skill composition of migration rates, we control for other potential factors that are likely to a¤ect the selectivity of migration. As Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987) argue the characteristics of those who emigrate from a particular country will depend on that country's wage distribution.
In poor countries, where the returns to skills are relatively high, there will be a "negative selection"of immigrants; whilst in rich countries, where returns to skills are relatively low, there will be "positive selection" of immigrants.
Thus we control for both returns to skills in the source country measured by income inequality, as well as for the wage-premium skill di¤erential in the host country. Second, the paper considers, and distinguishes between, immigration from developing source countries as well as developed ones, since the magnet e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the immigrant skill composition, and the …scal burden e¤ect of these immigrants may be di¤erent for (poor) developing countries compared to those from richer developed ones. Third, because a proper measure of immigrant skill is key to our analysis, we correct for educational quality an issue ignored in the empirical migration literature. In this way we attempt to obtain a relatively homogeneous classi…cation of skill levels using the Hanushek-Woesmann (2009) measure of cognitive skills. Finally, we also control for the potential endo-5 geneity problem : the skill composition of migration itself may in ‡uence the voters'attitude towards the generosity of the welfare state.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the theoretical framework underpinning our empirical analysis. Section three presents the data sources and discusses the schooling quality measure. Section four presents the econometric model and compares the …ndings for LDC source countries relative to DC source countries. Section …ve concludes.
Theory
We present a minimalist model which features two migration regimes: free migration and policy controlled migration regimes. 5 In a nutshell, the policycontrolled migration regime leads to a positive impact of the welfare bene…ts on the skill composition of migration rates since voters will internalize the fact that skilled migrants will be net contributors to the system-the …scal burden e¤ect-, whereas unskilled migrants will be net bene…ciaries-the social magnet e¤ect. Under the free migration regime the unskilled migrants will gravitate to a generous welfare state, while skilled migrants will shy away.
Model
There is a continuum of workers, where the number of native born is normalized to 1. Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, with two labor 5 See Razin, Sadka and Suwankiri (2011) for a more elaborate model.
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inputs, skilled and unskilled 6 :
where, Y is the GDP, A denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter, and L i denotes the input of labor of skill level i, where i = e; u for skilled and unskilled, respectively.
The competitive wages of skilled and unskilled labor are equal to marginal productivity, respectively
Aggregate labor supply, for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, is given by:
where e denotes the share of native born skilled in the total native born labor supply; denotes the share of skilled migrants in the total number of migrants; denotes the total number of migrants; and l i is the labor supply of an individual with skill level i 2 fe; ug:
Total population (native born and migrants) is:
We specify a simple welfare-state system which levies a proportional labor income tax at the rate , with the revenues redistributed equally to all residents (native born and migrants alike) as social bene…t per capita, b.
The social bene…t captures not only a cash transfer but also outlays on public services, such as education, health, and other provisions, that bene…t all workers, regardless of their contribution to the tax revenues.
The government budget constraint is therefore
Assume that the utility function for skill-type i 2 fe; ug is :
where c i denotes consumption of an individual with skill level i, l i denotes the individual labor supply and " > 0.
The budget constraint of an individual with skill level i is
Individual utility-maximization yields the following the labor supply equa-
It is then straightforward to calculate the general equilibrium wages for 8 skilled and unskilled workers, which are given respectively by
where
(1 )
In order to ensure that the skilled wage always exceeds the unskilled wage, w e > w u , we assume that
Policy-controlled Migration
Assume that the host country faces abundant supply of migrants of each one of the two skill types, so that host-country migration policy is the sole determinant of migration ‡ows. The policy is determined by the median voter in the host country .Let us assume that the policy decisions on the tax rate,
; and the total volume of migration, ; are exogenous. We do this in order to focus the analysis on a single endogenous policy variable, which is the skill composition of migrants, : Note that once ; ; are determined, then the social bene…t per capita, b, is given by the government budget constraint; we thus denote the social bene…t per capita b as b( ; ); where the exogenous variable is suppressed.
The indirect utility of an individual with skill level i is given by:
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Di¤erentiating the equation with respect to , and employing the envelope theorem, yields
Thus, a policy induced change in the share of skilled migrants in the total number of migrants, , a¤ects the utility level through two channels. First, an increase in raises average labor productivity and thereby tax revenues.
This, in turn, raises the social bene…t per capita, b. Second, an increase in , which raises the supply of skilled labor relative to the supply of unskilled labor, depresses the skill-premium in the labor market. If the decisive voter is unskilled, both of the above e¤ects increase her utility. Thus, an unskilled voter would like to set the skill-composition of migrants at the maximal limit, = 1: This means that the share of skilled migrants preferred by the decisive skilled voter is typically lower than that preferred by the decisive unskilled voter. The decisive skilled voter would like to set below 1 (which is equivalent to assuming that the …rst-order condition is met before reaches 1).
De…ning i as the share of skilled immigrants most preferred by an individual with skill level i = e; u in the host country, we get
Recall that the purpose is to …nd the e¤ect of the change in the generosity of the welfare state on the migration policy concerning . The generosity of the welfare state, captured by the magnitude of the social bene…t per capita, b, which depends positively on the tax rate, (we assume that economy is on the "correct side" of the La¤er curve). We thus look for the e¤ect of an increase in on the change in the skill composition of the migrants, . It can be shown that:
This means that, if the decisive voter is an unskilled worker, an increase in the tax rate, , would leave the skill migration policy unchanged, because it is always set at the maximum possible limit. If, however, the decisive voter is a skilled worker, an increase in the tax rate, , will change the policy concerning the skill-composition of migrants in the direction towards a larger share of skilled migrants. The reason is that when the tax rate is higher, the redistribution burden upon a skilled decisive voter increases. Allowing an additional skilled migrants can ease this rise in the …scal burden. Note also that the result applies to the skill mix of migration rates.
Free Migration
We now assume that no restrictions are placed on migration by the policy makers in the host country. The level of migration depends entirely on the choice made by would be potential migrants. In choosing whether to migrate or not, a potential migrant of skill i compares his prospective utility, V i , in the migration destination, to the reservation utility, denoted by u i in the source country. For each skill level i, we assume that there is a continuum of would-be migrants, di¤erent with respect to the reservation utility level in the source country. This heterogeneity of reservation utilities in the source country could stem from di¤erent traits of the potential migrants (e.g., family size, age, moving costs, forms of portable pensions, housing, cultural ties, etc.). Thus the host country faces an upward sloping supply curve, S(V i ), of potential migrants from the source country, for each skill level i.
Let m e be the number of skilled migrants, and m u is the number of unskilled migrants. The proportion of skilled migrants, , is de…ned then by:
The indirect utility function in the host country is given by:
The following equation determines, for each , the cut-o¤ levels of the reservation utilities (u e ( ) and u u ( ), for a would-be migrant of skill i = e; u;
as follows:
That is the marginal would be migrant is indi¤erent between staying in the source country or leaving to the destination country. We can use this equation
to …nd the number of migrants for each skill level. By de…nition, the number of migrants of each skill level, i = e; u, is determined by the supply of migrants for i = e; u, that is
We now attempt to …nd the e¤ect of an exogenous change in the generosity of the welfare state proxied by on the skill mixture of the migrants.
It could be shown that:
The rationale for this result is as follows. An increase in raises the social bene…t per capita, b, but lowers the net wage, (1 ) w i : For skill migrants, the fall in net wage outweighs the increase in the social bene…t per capita.
Thus, an increase in reduces the well-being of skilled workers. Consequently, an increase in reduces the cut-o¤ reservation utility of skilled migrants, u e ( ) : As a result, those skilled migrants with reservation utilities between the pre-increase level and the new cuto¤ level will choose not to migrate. The opposite holds true for unskilled migrants. Thus an increase in the generosity of the welfare state under free migration deters skilled migrants and attracts unskilled ones, thereby tilting the skill composition of migration towards unskilled migrants. The result does not apply only to the skill mix among migrants. Note that the skill mix in migration rates is also tilted towards unskilled migrants. This is the magnet e¤ect of the welfare state.
Empirical Analysis
Our aim is to test how the generosity of the welfare state a¤ects the skill di¤erence in migration rates into EUR countries across policy regimes for both developing and developed source countries after controlling for returns to skills in source and host countries. It is common to focus on developed countries (OECD countries) where skill levels (usually proxied by education attainment) are comparable given the potential heterogeneity in education quality across developed and developing countries. 
Data
We decompose our sample into three groups as follows. We only consider immigration to EUR the host countries. We distinguish between LDC and DC source countries and run separate regressions in order to compare the e¤ect of the welfare state in both cases. The determinants 7 Our sample of source countries is dictated by data availability on educational quality.
14 of emigration and the e¤ects of the generosity of the welfare state are likely to be di¤erent for poor developing countries relative to richer, developed ones:-e.g., the gap between the host and source countries in terms of wages, amenities, social spending and welfare are larger for developing countries.
The analysis uses bilateral migration data from Docquier and Marfouk Examining the non-parametric evidence based on our sample, Table 2 shows, for example, that Sweden a highly generous welfare state attracts higher rate of unskilled than skilled (about 30% higher) from other EUR whereas Spain a less generous welfare state attracts higher rate of skilled than unskilled migrants (48% higher) from other EUR. A the same time, in both countries immigration rates from restricted regimes (both DC and LDC) are more skilled than those from free migration regimes (EUR). It is also worth noting that there is also high correlation between the two indicators of the generosity of the welfare state, social expenditure as percent of GDP and social expenditure per capita.
Quality of Education and Enforcement of Immigration Policies
Since our interest is in the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of migration rates, controlling for the heterogeneity in the skill (education) measurement is essential. Indeed, Coulombe and Tremblay We use their imputed average test scores in math and science for primary through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100) for all source countries in our sample as our measure of Education Quality (EQ). 8 We adjust for varying quality of education across countries by using relative quality of education in the source country relative to that in the host country REQ = EQ s =EQ h and interact that with the migration stocks. It is important to note two caveats due to the constraints of this quality measure. First, this quality measure does not vary over time since it is an average for various years thus we use the same measure for migration stocks in the 1990s and 2000s. Second, we use the same quality measure for the three educational levels. However, we check for the robustness of our quality of education by using di¤erent methods to adjust for quality of education across countries. Note that the e¤ect of welfare state generosity on the skill di¤erence selectivity of the migrants under free migration is captured in the above equation by the coe¢ cient 2 . Therefore, the null hypothesis describing this e¤ect is:
In addition, the e¤ect of welfare state generosity on the skill di¤erence selectivity of migration rates in the case of restricted migration is captured by the coe¢ cient 2 + 3 . Therefore the null hypothesis describing this e¤ect is:
Controls
We control for other factors that are likely to be skill dependent as follows.
First, we attempt to control for other immigration policy measures in the host country that might have an e¤ect on the skill composition of immigrants. We use refugees as a share in total immigrants in 1990 in the host country based on the United Nations Population Division Statistics. 10 To capture the e¤ect of family re-uni…cation schemes adopted in host countries we use the stock of past migrants from the source country in the host country in 1990. Both variables are expected to have a negative impact on the migrant skill mix, since both policies attract low-skilled migrants.
One important determinant of migration is the wage di¤erential or the skill di¤erential between source and host countries. We use real GDP per 10 Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain data on the number or share of refugees for source-host pairs. We have also experimented with using the number of refugees and asylum seekers in the host in 1997, and all our results were robust.
22 capita (PPP) in 1990, constant US dollars, for both host and source countries in the absence of data on wages in the source countries. We also use average unemployment rates (average for 1990-1995) in both source and host countries.
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To capture better the Roy-Borjas selectivity factors which are likely to a¤ect immigration selectivity, we use a battery of controls: (i) inequality measure (the Gini coe¢ cient) in the source country in 1990; 12 (ii) as a proxy for the returns to skill in the host country, the log value of the skilledunskilled native labor stock ratio in 1990 13 ; (iii) instead of (ii), for the host country, the ratio of skilled-unskilled wage di¤erential measured by the ratio of labor compensation per employee in US dollars PPP in 1995 14 ; and (iv) the di¤erence in unemployment rates between the skilled and unskilled in the host country in 1998. 15 Additional bilateral controls, such as the distance between source-host countries, which might deter unskilled immigrants more than skilled ones, strong relation dummy based on past colonization, and same-language in 11 Both GDP per capita and unemployment rates are from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 12 Data on the Gini coe¢ cient are from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID) 2008. 13 The last two control variables do not add up to one because we omitted workers with fewer than eight years of schooling. 14 Skilled is …nancial and business services and unskilled is construction. Source OECD Stat. 15 Unemployment rates of the population aged 25-64 by level of education; skilled is de…ned as upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education levels 3-4 (ISCED, 1997) and unskilled is de…ned as pre-primary, primary and lower-secondary education levels 0-2 (ISCED, 1997). Source: Eurostat.
source-host countries, which might make immigration particularly attractive for unskilled workers are included. We also control for quantity of education using average years of schooling (+25 years ) in the source country, extracted from the World Bank World Development Indicators, in addition to adjusting for educational quality as mentioned above. As a robustness check we also use …xed e¤ects for source country in order to capture all potential push factors. We also use clustering for each pair of source-host countries.
Endogeneity of The Welfare State Generosity
A potential endogeneity problem may arise-in particular between the level of bene…ts in the host country, B h , and the skill di¤erence in the migra- We also instrument the interaction R s;h :B h using the interaction between the legal origin and R s;h :The legal system indicates cultural and social features of the host countries and re ‡ect also basic constitutional notion regarding the attitude towards property rights on the one hand, and social rights on the other hand. Indeed we …nd a strong correlation between the legal origin and the welfare bene…ts (cor = 60%). It is also the case that legal origin is very weakly correlated with the dependent variable, the skill di¤erence of mi-gration rates (cor = 1%). Yet, one concern might be that legal origin might be correlated with, for example, an omitted variable such as the economic development which is known to a¤ect migration, and that could potentially undermine the validity of the exclusion restriction. The empirical literature, however, is mixed with respect to whether legal origin has a signi…cant impact on economic development. For example, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) do not …nd evidence that the legal system signi…cantly a¤ect economic growth.
However to ensure that this is not a possible channel for us, we include GDP growth rate in the host country as a control variable. In that way the only open channel for legal origin to a¤ect migration is through the instrumented B h . But in fact we don't …nd GDP growth rate to be signi…cant.
FE e¤ects, clustering
5 Main Findings
Speci…cation 1a
We …rst examine the estimates for Speci…cation 1a. Table 3 presents the OLS estimation results for both DCs and LDCs for our variables of interest.
Our …rst hypothesis relates to the e¤ect of welfare state bene…ts on the skill di¤erence in migration rates within free-migration regime. The social magnet hypothesis is indeed con…rmed (the …rst row) for Group A. The coe¢ cient is negative and signi…cant. That is, the generosity of the welfare state adversely a¤ects the skill di¤erence of migration in the free-migration regime, capturing the market-based supply-side e¤ect.
The …scal burden hypothesis, relates to the considerations of the host country's voters in policy-controlled migration regimes, is also con…rmed.
As suggested in the Theory section, the di¤erence between the di¤erential e¤ect of bene…ts across the controlled and free-migration regimes should be positive. Indeed, the coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cantly di¤erent than the corresponding coe¢ cient in the free migration regime (second row) for DCs (Group B). That is, the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of migrants is positively a¤ected by the migration policy of the host countries. However the coe¢ cient is not always signi…cant for
LDCs (Group C) suggesting our a priori concern about the endogeneity of welfare bene…ts. Similar results are obtained when using migration stocks that are adjusted for quality of education, i.e. EQ s =EQ h (see Table 2 ).
The inclusion of the returns to skill proxy measured by the skilled-unskilled native labor stocks ratio in the host country in 1990 (column 2), or (column 3) the skilled-unskilled wage di¤erential does not have much of an e¤ect on the magnitude or signi…cance of the coe¢ cients of the welfare-state bene…ts.
Turing to Table 4 which presents the IV estimates, it is important to note that the …rst stage Cragg-Donald F-statistics show that our instruments are not subject to weak instrument concerns. Indeed, we …nd evidence in favor of the magnet hypothesis, i.e. a negative and signi…cant e¤ect of welfarestate bene…ts on the skill composition of immigrants within a free-migration regime. The generosity of the welfare-state adversely a¤ects the skill composition of migrants in the free-migration regime. As predicted, using the IV, we …nd the e¤ect of the generosity of the welfare-state on the skill composition of migrants under the policy-controlled migration regime is positive, for 26 both developed (Group B, Column 1) and developing countries (Group C, Column 4). This result also holds after controlling for all the other push-pull factors (Columns 2 and 3 for DCs and Columns 5 and 6 for LDCs). Recall that in the case of the OLS estimates LDC coe¢ cients were not signi…cant.
Turning to the restricted -migration regime we con…rm the …scal burden hypothesis for both developed and developing source countries. That is in Columns 2-7, 3 is positive and signi…cant. in this regression, unadjusted for educational quality, the e¤ect of the generosity tends to be larger for DCs compared to LDCs. In terms of magnitude, our results suggest that 1% increase in welfare-state bene…t per capita spending changes the skill di¤erence in migration rates in favour of skilled migrants for LDCs by about 2.0% and for DCs migrants by about 3.5%. Table 6 presents IV estimates using migration rates that are adjusted for quality of education. It is clear that our previous results pertaining to the negative e¤ect of the welfare-state bene…ts on the skill di¤erence in migration rates of immigrants within the free-migration regime hold. A positive e¤ect within the restricted-migration regime for both DCs and LDCs hold after adjusting for the quality of education also con…rm the …scal burden e¤ect.
Furthermore controlling for quality of education strengthens the positive effects of the skill composition of LDCs, and hardly changes the estimate for DCs. We …nd that a 1% increase in welfare-state bene…t spending would improve the skill composition of LDCs migrants by around 2.5% and of DCs migrants by around 3.4%.
There are potentially several reasons for the di¤erence in e¤ect of the welfare spending on migrant skill composition between LDCs and DCs. First, it could be because policies controlling for immigration typically ignore di¤er-ences in educational quality even though they generate di¤erent …scal burdens. Second, it could also be due to family re-uni…cation and refugee immigration policies adopted by EU countries-which are imperfectly measured in our analysis.
Turning to the other control variables, the variables capturing immigration policies adopted in the EU have negative e¤ects, as expected: the share of refugees in total migrants in the host country in 1990 and the total migrant stock from the source country in the host country in 1990, have negative but insigni…cant e¤ects. However, for LDCs, the total stock of migrants in 1990
has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect which can be interpreted as a diaspora e¤ect as in Beine et al (2011) .
Finally, examining the di¤erential e¤ect of returns to skills under the two policy regimes, we …nd, interestingly, that inequality in the source country has a negative signi…cant e¤ect on the skill mix of migrants from both LDCs and DCs under restrictive migration and a positive e¤ect under free migration. Both are consistent with the Roy-Borjas hypothesis. As for the relative returns to skill in the host, the higher the high-low labor ratio, the lower are the returns to skill and the lower are the skill di¤erence in migration rates.
However, this e¤ect seems to be signi…cant only for DCs. Indeed, using the wage di¤erential between high-and low-skilled in the host country, which is a better measure of returns to skills, shows that there is a positive relationship between the returns to skill and the skill composition of migrants for both DCs and LDCs under controlled migration, and no di¤erential e¤ect for free migration. Thus overall, the results indicate that even after controlling for returns to skills, the generosity of the welfare state matters for the skill composition of immigrants.
Speci…cation 1b
Examining the estimates from the second speci…cation 1b associated with the ‡ow dependent variable, Table 7 shows that for both DCs and LDCs, the social magnet hypothesis holds, and that the …ndings support the …scal burden hypothesis. When adjusting for the ‡ows by Relative Education Quality, again the estimates for LDCs are a¤ected more than those for DCs, but our previous results are all upheld.
Robustness Checks
Returning to speci…cation 1a, we provide in this sub-section a few robustness checks by using di¤erent methods to adjust for education quality and using di¤erent measure for bene…ts as follow.
Alternative Educational Quality Adjustments
Using Hanushek and Wossemann (2009) educational quality index, we adjust the migration rates by interacting them with EQ s as shown in panel 1 of Table 8 . Similarly using the Hanushek and Wossemann (2009) educational quality index, we weight migration rates with EQ s in panel 2 of Table 8 . In both cases our previous results are robust.
An Alternative Measure for the Generosity of the Welfare State
Finally, we check whether our measure of the welfare generosity is robust.
In Table 8 , panel 3, we replace the level of bene…ts per capita measure by social spending as percent of GDP. Again, we …nd the generosity of the welfare state adversely a¤ects the skill di¤erence of migration in the freemigration regime, capturing the market-based supply-side e¤ect, whilst the …scal burden hypothesis, capturing the considerations of the host country's voters in policy-controlled migration regimes, is also con…rmed.
Conclusion
In a free-migration regime, a typical welfare state with relatively abundant capital and high total factor productivity (implying relatively high wages for all skill levels) attracts both unskilled and skilled migrants. On the other hand, the generosity of the welfare state attracts unskilled (poor) migrants, as they are net bene…ciaries of the generous welfare state. In contrast, potential skilled (rich) migrants are deterred by the generosity of the welfare state.
Thus the generosity of the welfare state shifts the migrant skill composition towards the unskilled. In the restricted-migration regime, these same considerations lead voters to favor skilled migration. Voters are motivated by : how migration a¤ects their wages, and how it bears on the …nances of the welfare state. Typically, unskilled migration depresses the unskilled wage and boosts the skilled wage. The opposite occurs with skilled migration. From a public …nance point of view, native-born voters of all skills would therefore opt for the skilled to come and for the unskilled to stay away to mitigate the …scal burden.
We utilize the free labor movement within EUR (the EU, Norway and Switzerland) and the restricted movement from outside of the EUR to compare the free migration regime to the restricted migration regime. We …nd strong support for the "magnet hypothesis" under the free-migration regime, and the "…scal burden hypothesis" under the restricted-migration regime even after controlling for di¤erences in returns to skills in source and host countries.
Our …ndings highlight the importance of controlling for educational quality when studying high skilled migration from LDCs. In addition, it is clear from our analysis that immigration policies favoring high-skilled migrants do need to take into account educational quality. Hence, a selective immigration scheme based on years of education solely will not be as e¤ective in identifying the high skilled as a point-based system where ability (for example, language ability and labour market experience) are considered. Another important implication of our …ndings is that under free-migration, the generosity of the welfare state acts as a magnet for the unskilled. This suggests that harmonizing the minimum welfare provision within the EU may be an attractive option to reduce the negative e¤ect of the welfare state on the skill composition of EU immigrants under free-migration. Notes: All the migration rates are adjusted for the quality of education by the relative education quality in source to host country, i.e. REQ = (EQ s /EQ h ); F=free migration; R=Restricted migration. Regressions include log distance, dummy for same language in host and source, strong dummy between host and source, and real GDP per capita in host and in source.
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. migration; R=Restricted migration. Instrumented using legal origin dummies, and the interaction of legal origin dummies and R. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All the migration rates are adjusted for the quality of education by relative quality in source to host, i.e. REQ = (EQ s /EQ h ) , F=free migration; R=Restricted migration. Instrumented using legal origin dummies, and the interaction of legal origin dummies and R. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Instrumented using legal origin dummies and the interaction of legal origin dummies and R. 1 Both models have all controls as in Table 5 , column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs). 2 Both models have all controls as in Table 6 , column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs). Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Both models have all controls as in Table 6 , column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs), but migration rates are interacted by Source Country Educational Quality. 2 Both models have all controls as in Table 6 , column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs), but migration rates are weighted by Source Country Educational Quality. 3 Both models have all controls as in Table 5 , column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs). 4 Both models have all controls as in Table 6 , column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs). Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Notes: EQ = average test score in maths and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100). 
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